

# ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA: IMPACT, CHALLENGES, AND GLOBAL REPERCUSSIONS

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## ABSTRACT

*This study examines the role of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool, focusing on the case of Russia. Historically, sanctions have been employed by nations to exert pressure on adversaries through economic means. In modern contexts, the scope of sanctions has evolved to include travel bans, trade embargoes, and asset seizures. Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the United States and its allies imposed extensive sanctions on Russia, significantly impacting its economy, politics, and society. This research aims to assess the effectiveness of these sanctions in altering Russia's behaviour and to explore how the country has adapted to them. By analysing the direct economic effects on key sectors and the broader implications for international relations, the study seeks to contribute to the understanding of sanctions as a complex instrument of coercion in global politics.*

*Keywords: Economic sanctions, Russia, Foreign policy, International Relations, Adaptation, Effectiveness.*

## INTRODUCTION

Economic sanctions, also known as trade sanctions are not new to many (Demir, 2024). Countries have used economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool for centuries (United States General Accounting Office, 1992). Indeed, for centuries, nations have used military tools and economic sanctions to punish other nations. The weapon was used against adversaries to bring them to their knees through economic sanctions, albeit through indirect wars. However, the nature of economic sanctions and their goals have changed tremendously over time. (Jan, 2023). In modern times, the definition slightly shifted from what was said. Today, it refers to travel bans, trade embargoes, export restrictions,

and asset seizure of sanctioned entities as countries, companies, or individual bodies (Demir, 2024). In addition, economic sanctions' nature and goals have changed dramatically over time (Jan, 2023). The case of Russia is taken to study as it is under the grip of economic sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies, including Western countries and the European Union. From the economic, political, and societal points of view, Russia's economy, politics, and society have been affected far beyond the sanctions' borders, making the sanctions a key point of friction in relations between Russia and the international community.

## **BACKGROUND**

Over the history of most nation-states, economic sanctions have always been a significant part of that nation-state's foreign policy. Economic sanctions have been used to affect foreign policy and national security objectives and meet present domestic political and economic pressures and needs (Alexander, 2009). According to Abughris (2024), sanctions first appeared recorded in the world in 432 BC, when the Athenian Empire banned Megara traders from its marketplaces and thus strangled the economy of rival city-states. The Romans also used economic sanctions to punish rebellious provinces. It also includes such other early sanctions as the Continental System, which Napoleon imposed against the British during the Napoleonic Wars, the US Embargo Act of 1807, which Thomas Jefferson's administration banned foreign trade with Britain and France to try to prevent impressment of American soldiers by the British, and numerous blockades and embargoes between the North and South during the American Civil War (Dvorin, 2022).

Moreover, British officials made preparations for World War I, especially in the context of free trade. Nicholas Lambert, a historian, has revealed that British naval officials thought of drastic measures to stop the war as fast as possible by isolating Germany and its allies from the global economy (Farrell, 2022). The League of Nations in 1919 included the establishment of the League of Nations imposing verbal or economic sanctions against an aggressor or nations who violated its provisions (OUPblog, 2011).

Economic sanctions were a standard means in various conflicts in the 20th century. Economic sanctions did, in fact, succeed in November 1935, but were fruitless in checking Mussolini's occupation of Abyssinia (Justin, 2021). In 1939-1941, the US, Britain, and the Netherlands imposed trade restrictions against Japan, putting compound containment measures against

Japan into effect to weaken it economically. Imposing restrictions on bilateral trade played an important role in achieving this strategic goal (Compound Containment, 2022, pp. 61-78) In Cold War like the US sanctions against Cuba, the 1960s–1970s United Nations (UN) sanctions against Rhodesia, the 1981–1983 Siberian gas pipeline and the 1980s antiapartheid sanctions, and post-Cold War cases like Iraq, Serbia, Haiti, Libya, and Iran (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2000).

Nevertheless, in recent years, economic sanctions have been used (decidedly, in 2014, several countries took targeted economic sanctions against Russia connected to its annexation of Crimea and behaviour in eastern Ukraine). In addition, in February 2022, after the invasion of Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, and other countries introduced or significantly expanded sanctions on Russia (Geneva Graduate Institute, 2022).

### **Statement of the Problem**

Particularly with Russia, the use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy instrument has been a divisive one. Crimea in 2014 and continuous involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine have led to the imposed by the United States, European Union, and other countries. These sanctions' effects and ramifications on Russia's political and economic environment are extensive and complex.

### **Objectives of the Study**

1. To assess the impact of economic sanctions on Russia's political and economic landscape, determining their effectiveness as a tool of foreign policy.
2. To examine the direct economic effects of sanctions on key sectors of the Russian economy, including energy, finance, and trade, and how these have influenced overall economic performance.
3. To explore how Russia has adapted to the imposition of sanctions, including shifts in trade partnerships and domestic policy changes aimed at mitigating economic challenges.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **Theoretical Framework**

The framework used in this study is multifaceted, realist, liberal, and

constructivist, while applying them to the impact of economic sanctions on Russia. Sanctions are instruments of coercion against adversaries without military engagements, and states act in their self-interest; this is realism. Hence, this perspective highlights the competitive aspect of international relations, and sanctions deter aggressions and demonstrate power (Drezner, 2000).

Liberalism encourages adherence to global norms and the role of international institutions, while sanctions instigate compliance with global standards. From this perspective, sanctions do not only entail punishment but can also help promote dialogue and produce compliance with the obligations entrenched within international expectations regarding human rights and territorial integrity (Orenstein & Kelemen, 2017).

It further adds how identities and social norms shape state behaviour. However, the role of narratives for sanctions and sanctions for public perception and legitimacy is underscored. According to this theory, whether or not sanctions work depends on how the targeted state and the international community perceive and frame them (Bosse, 2022).

The study seeks to synthesize these theories to systematically study the complexities and potential consequences of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool, especially in the context of Russia's foreign policy action.

### **Historical Context of Russia-West Relations**

Throughout the history, Russia has a complicated relationship with Western powers (Tellis, 2024). Scholars and experts have explored and published research reports and articles on the Russian relationships with the West and the way they evolved and worked out.

The 16th century was the time when Russia was first established in direct contact with the West and they had a **love-hate relationship** with the West since. Such ambiguity has historical reasons. From the Christianity to socialism, Russia has always shared many ideas with the West (Bogatyrev, 2022). Furthermore, Imperial Russia was emerging as a great power in Europe in the 1700s, it confronted other Nordic and European powers. In addition, relations between neighbouring states were tense and therefore 18th century an example of this is when the French ambassador, the Baron de Breteuil, noted cultural disjoints between Russia and other European powers (Murphy, 2024).

Scholars have examined Russia's foreign policy during 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup>

century, highlighting its conflicts with European powers such as Poland and Sweden in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and France and Britain in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Overall, Russia's relations with Western powers were shaped by its expansionist policies and its desire to establish itself as a major European power such as in the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Russia assumed a key role in a big European conflict – the **Seven Years' War** (Lavrov, 2018). Moreover, the Congress of Vienna (1815) marked a significant turning point between Russia – Western relationship. 1815 marked a peak of Russian power in Europe, Russia emerged as one of the great European powers (Ellman, 2022).

Some scholars argue that there has been use of soft power between Russia and the western power on other side. Russia and Europe have been rather closely connected from political, economic and cultural standpoints over the last five centuries as Aust (2016) holds. The relationship between Soviet Union (and Russia post 1991) and other European countries and societies went beyond the dynastic relations, political alliances, economic trade and individuals transfers of culture in the course of the 18th century onwards.

Moreover, the WW2 was a period of high levels of cooperation and was necessary to securing the defeat of Nazi Germany by United States, its allies and Russia (U.S. Department of State, 2016). The range between the Western powers and Russia were also characterized back to Cold war era by heavy shift from cooperation to confrontation (German, 2024). Nevertheless, this has been the most serious crisis in Russian–Western relations since the end of the Cold War in terms of mutual sanctions by the United States, the European Union and some other Western allies versus Russia (Menkiszak, 2016).

Additionally, according to Podraza (2025) the tension escalated after the expansion of the EU and NATO's influence in the post-Soviet region reinforced Russia's sense of being treated as a defeated power by the West. This sentiment was further fuelled by the belief that the West lacked respect for Russian interests and dignity, giving rise to what has been termed the "**Weimar syndrome**"- a phenomenon associated with the asymmetric end of the Cold War.

### **Current Studies and Findings on Russia Sanctions**

Recent studies have shown that the effect of sanctions on Russia's economy has been complex. The United States government's use of targeted economic sanctions in an attempt to force changes to public policy in Russia

stems from the passage of the Magnitsky Sanction, Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 and began with a list of eighteen individuals in April 2013 not affiliated with any specific crimes or injustices, only identified to have broken civil and human rights in Russia. Such sanctions were imposed in multiple rounds from March and April 2014 and repeated in three rounds from July and September 2014 and again in September and October 2017 (Gaur et al., 2023). Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US, UK, and EU have added sanctions, among countries including Australia, Canada, and Japan, more than 16,500 sanctions have been placed on Russia (BBC, 2022). Since then, roughly 1,000 multinational companies and counting have ceased business in Russia. This decrease in the presence of multinationals will result in an unavoidable negative shock on sector-specific total factor productivity (TFCP) (McDaniel & Ghei, 2022). The most significant proportion of Russia's pain on the economy is due to the loss of FDI from subsidiaries of companies domiciled in the allied nations, and therefore, the entire trade embargo by the West and withdrawal of FDI potentially reduce the GDP of Russia by 28 percent, proclaimed by Mahlstein et. al. (2022).

### **Gaps in the Literature**

Research on sanctions and their long-term effects on Russia's internal dynamics and international relations is significantly lacking. While most of the existing studies concentrate on issues regarding the immediate economic impacts, including the decline in GDP and the disruption of trade, almost no consideration is given to the socio-political effects of long-term sanctions on public opinion and governance in Russia.

Moreover, the literature neglects how the sanctions affect Russia's relations with non-Western countries, which might respond to Western sanctions with other strategies. The fact that it closes this gap helps to fill the lacuna in understanding the global economic picture as countries figure out how to navigate the sanctions regime.

In addition, where sanctions are even deemed effective thus far in altering state behaviour, their unintended outcomes are rarely examined, particularly the risk that sanctions may buttress nationalist sentiments and perpetuate authoritarianism in the targeted state. It is important to address these gaps to understand the intricacies surrounding economic sanctions and broader relations issues in international relations in the current context

of developing countries.

## **Findings**

### **Overview of Economic Sanctions Against Russia**

With the advent of Russia's occupation of Crimea in 2014, sanctions have been the first weapon in the Western arsenal of coercive diplomacy against Russia's integration into the global financial markets. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 represented a turning point in which countries aligned themselves in an unprecedented manner through sanctions, ranging from export controls and restrictions to relevant sectors, including energy (Itskhoki & Ribakova, 2024).

Moreover, the Russia sanctions can be divided into three phases. After Russia annexed Crimea and the start of Russia-sponsored war in Eastern Ukraine, there was the first phase. In March 2014, the United States added to the Treasury Department's Sectoral Sanctions Identifications (SSI) List under the Executive Order sectoral sanctions on the Russian economy's financial, energy, and defence sectors, which brought the entities in these sectoral sanctions under sectoral sanctions concerning the United States. Many of these sanctions fell on the financial industry (Welt et al., 2022).

Largely unilaterally somewhat haphazard actions of the US, like the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), passed in August 2017, including cybersecurity, crude oil projects, financial institutions, defence sector, and penalizing banks and others, characterized the second phase of sanctions on Russia between 2015 and 2021. In April 2018, sanctions on Russian oligarchs and companies such as Rusal (a Russian aluminum company) affected global aluminium markets and in 2019 and 2021, restrictions on Russian sovereign debt were affected, for example, cybersecurity, oil projects, finance, or defence (Itskhoki & Ribakova, 2024).

Additionally, following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the international community has imposed extensive sanctions against Russia in a third phase of sanctions. Much of the original set of sanctions, which were financial sector sanctions and denied Russia access to global financial markets and architecture, was reissued and thereby received more staying power. However, before the invasion, the US had gone after sovereign debt markets, financial institutions, and Kremlin elites. Following Germany's suspension of its certification on February 2022, the US sanctioned the Nord

Stream 2 pipeline operator on February 23, 2022 (Hilgenstock, Ribakova, & Wolff, 2023).

Furthermore, the US, EU, and G7 took broader sanctions on restricting Russia's currency exposure, freezing assets, and banning export controls, removing many Russian banks from SWIFT (Hilgenstock, Ribakova, & Wolff, 2023). Another essential part of the third phase of sanctions and the US expanded export controls further (Kilcrease, 2022) such as the US and UK imposing an embargo on Russian oil, the European Union taking its sixth sanctions, banning oil imports from Russia altogether, and natural gas (Itskhoki & Ribakova, 2024).

Also, Ukraine's allies sought to hamper Russian oil and gas revenues. The G7/EU set up the price cap mechanism for Russian crude oil and oil products to respond to these issues. Crude oil, effective from December 5, 2022, when the embargo started, was set at a cap of \$60 per barrel. The cap was also introduced on February 5, 2023, for oil products with a \$45 per barrel cap in place for oil products trading at a discount to crude oil, e.g., fuel oil, and a \$100 per barrel cap for oil products selling at a premium to crude oil, e.g., diesel (Itskhoki & Ribakova, 2024).


At the beginning of March 2022, the Russian Federation was subjected to a significant number of sanctions imposed against its economy, which have a significant impact on it. Moreover, the effect of Western sanctions on both Russia's GDP and levels of personal disposable income has been considerable. Russia which is world's 11th largest economy (Figure1) and its role as the prime commodity exporter among emerging markets gives it a structurally significant position (Mulder, 2022).

### **Economic Impact of Sanctions on Russia**

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*Figure 1: Russia has the world's 11<sup>th</sup> largest country*



Source: World Bank

### **Energy Sector and Export Revenue**

Europe was Russia’s largest energy export market. Moscow supplied nearly 40 percent of the natural gas consumed by the EU and nearly one-third of the bloc’s crude oil. In 2022, the EU announced an embargo on imports of most Russian crude oil and joined the G7 price cap.

However, the sanctions have inflicted pain on Russia’s economy, with oil and gas revenue declining when the price cap was implemented. According to the Kyiv School of Economics, Russian oil exports “dropped to \$64.40 per barrel” at the end of 2024 (exports were initially \$70 per barrel). This suggests that the Russian government is generating less revenue from oil sales (Temnycky, 2025). Additionally, according to CREA, Russia’s oil export revenue increased by 41% (EUR 136 bn) from the start of the sanctions in December 2022 until the end of February 2025. In February alone, a USD 30 per barrel price cap would have slashed Russian revenues by 40% (EUR 4.26 bn). Additionally, since introducing sanctions until the end of February


2025, thorough enforcement of the price cap would have cut Russia’s export revenues by 12% (EUR 40.4 bn) (approximately EUR 1.2 bn) (Figure 2) (Katinas & Raghunandan, 2025).

Figure 2: Russia’s seaborne oil export revenue with enhanced price cap

Pricing scenario | Million EUR per day

### Russia's seaborne oil export revenue with enhanced price caps

Pricing scenario | Million EUR per day



Source: CREA analysis based on Kpler, Marine Traffic and customs data.



Source: Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA)


## Domestic Economic Challenges

The sanctions have created major domestic economic problems, inflation and domestic interest rates in Russia in the twenties, loss of reserves of foreign exchange, bankruptcy in domestic businesses and enterprises, and an increase of difficulties in interbank and state bank transactions. By January 2025, 1733 individuals and 382 entities were subject to UK sanctions under the Russian regime, and more than 2400 entities were under EU sanctions. The broad spectrum of companies and individuals working in and affected by the measures included billions of pounds and dollars of money and significant assets in companies and real estate (Szyszczak, 2025).

In addition, sanctions on the Russian financial system greatly impacted the Bank of Russia. Around \$300 billion, out of \$640 billion of assets, were frozen, causing domestic bank runs and sharp ruble depreciation (Ribakova, 2022).

In addition, the inflation rate in Russia in December 2024, which was comparable to the previous year, was 9.5 percent. In 2024, the inflation rate was expected to rise by 7.9 percent; the highest rate obtained during the period observed was in April 2022, at 17.8 percent (Figure: 3) (Statista Research Department, 2025).

*Figure 3 : Inflation rate from April 2022 to December 2024 in Russia*



Source: Statista Research Department

The sanctions have also severely cracked down on Russia's human capital. Beyond that, an exodus of talented and skilled workers, especially in the tech sector, has really hurt Russia's global competitiveness. Official data from the Ministry for Digital Development (Prokopyenko, 2024) indicates that around 100,000 IT specialists emigrated from Russia in 2022 and did not come back.

Along with Rosstat information, the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) rate showed that in mid-2023, the unemployment rate was 6.8 percent (approx. 4.8 mil. people, Harward, 2025). The limits of Russia's


production capacity were stark in 2024. Eighty-one percent of the industrial facilities were working at their capacity, while 73 percent of the enterprises stated labor shortages. The number of people out of work on the High Street for the first time in memory is just 2.3 percent, with some 1.6 million jobs unrecovered (Prokopenko, 2024).

### Adaptation and Economic Resilience

Some analysts claim that Russia has managed to find ways to overcome these obstacles. However, King’s College London (2024) International Monetary Fund also reported in 2022 that the first war year in Russia caused the economy to dwindle by 2.1%. Its various sanctions have allowed Russia to import many of these sanctioned Western goods by partnering with countries such as Georgia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (BBC, 2024). However, these figures show that Russia’s economy grew by 2.2 percent in 2023 and 1.1 percent in 2024 ( Figure : 4 ) (IMF, 2024). However, the US Treasury argues that the sanctions are damaging Russia, cutting its economic growth by 5%. (BBC, 2024).

The IMF’s initial predictions in spring 2022 that GDP would be slashed between 8 and 9 percent as a result of sanctions (Chavarria, 2024) are less bleak than realized. More importantly, this indicates that sanctions did not bring the Russian economy down (Berman, 2024).

Figure 4 : How Sanctions have affected Russian GDP




Source: IMF and US Treasury calculations

However, the Western sanctions inspired Russia to connect itself deeper into China’s embrace. Moreover, in 2023, both countries showed a trade

turnover of over \$240 billion: Russia’s imports from China comprised 38 percent, and its exports to China were 31 percent. In December 2023, Russia received payments in yuan for 35.8 percent of its exports and paid 37 percent of its imports in yuan.<sup>23</sup> From then, in the same period, it took Ruble payments for 35.7 percent of its exports and payments in Rubles for 31.5 percent of its imports. That amount — \$68.7 billion in yuan and \$64.7 billion in dollars — is more than the amount Russian companies and individuals held in 2023, which was \$68.7 billion ( Figure : 5 ) (Prokopenko, 2024)

*Figure 5 : Trade turnover between Russia and China, 2022- 2023*



Source: China’s General Administration of Customs, Russian Central Bank

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## **Russia's Response to Sanctions ( Russia from west to east )**

In response to Western countries' economic sanctions against Russia, changed export picture since 2022 boils down to two factors: the EU dramatically pivoting away from buying Russian oil and gas, and China and India replacing them as the main buyers. Russia developed a multi-prong attack strategy to counteract its negative impact on the Russian economy and political scene. Key aspects of Russia's response include:

### **1. Reduced Dependence on Western Markets:**

Economic diversification is one way to reduce Russia's dependence on Western markets. Russia has pursued expansion and diversification of partnership networks and trade relations, especially with non-Western countries like China and India. This has also included a new trade agreement and a change in exports to these nations to compensate for lost business in the West.

### **2. Domestic Production Enhancement:**

Russia's government measures to facilitate the development of domestic industries (agriculture and technology). Import substitution initiatives have been developed that seek to substitute foreign items with locally produced ones, thus decreasing the risk of exposure to sanctions. For example, the agricultural sector has grown tremendously, and Russia has become a leading grain exporter worldwide.

### **3. Sanction Response:**

Response to sanctions has included increasing foreign currency reserves and encouraging the use of the Ruble in international trade. Sanctions have also made inflation worse, compounded by the measures the Central Bank of Russia has taken to stabilize currency.

### **4. The use of sanctions as political rhetoric:**

Among, the citizens of the Russian government by turning them into nationalism. In this way, the government has painted sanctions, which are framed as acts of aggression from the West, as unifying elements, strengthening support for the policies. Such has been the case, as many experienced economic hardships but more favoured.

5. Resilient businesses:

Russian businesses have adapted to the new economic environment, which has enabled them to innovate. Many companies have innovated in finding alternative suppliers and markets, demonstrating the flexibility given by the external environment.

Overall, Russia's response to sanctions involves strategic adaptation, economic resilience, and political mobilization that seeks to blunt the effect of outside pressures and strengthen the country's national unity.

**International Community's Role**

The international community is crucial in addressing global challenges and fostering cooperation among nations. This role is primarily facilitated through institutions like the United Nations (UN), which serves as a dialogue and collective action platform. The UN's Charter emphasizes resolving disputes peacefully and promoting social progress, human rights, and international law.

One of the UN's primary functions is to maintain international peace and security. It achieves this by deploying peacekeeping missions, mediating conflicts, and imposing sanctions when necessary. These actions aim to prevent conflicts from escalating and to protect vulnerable populations. The effectiveness of these measures often hinges on the commitment and cooperation of member states, highlighting the interdependence of global peace efforts.

In addition to peacekeeping, the international community enhances economic cooperation through various treaties and agreements. These frameworks aim to create a more equitable global trading system and support sustainable development initiatives, particularly in developing countries. Economic collaboration fosters growth and stability, which is essential for addressing broader social issues.

Moreover, the international community addresses pressing global issues such as climate change, health pandemics, and humanitarian crises. Organizations like the UN can effectively tackle challenges that transcend

national borders by coordinating responses and mobilizing resources. Collaborative efforts in these areas underscore the necessity of a unified approach to complex global problems.

The international community must ensure that globalization benefits all nations, particularly marginalized ones. This requires a commitment to inclusive policies that promote equity and solidarity among states, as emphasized in the UN's Millennium Report. In summary, the international community's role is vital in fostering cooperation, promoting peace, and addressing global challenges through collective action and shared values.

## **CONCLUSION**

### **Summary of Key Findings**

On the large dimension of the extent to which economic sanctions against Russia are effective, within their responses and upon international relations. According to one of the key findings, sanctions inflicted great economic pain on Russia but have seen mixed results at the political end of the leveling scale. The sanctions have chipped away at the economy's GDP and raised inflation. Still, they haven't tamed the Kremlin's strategy using strikes that are calculated accordingly, specifically in Ukraine.

One of the most significant findings is that Russia valiantly expanded the economy, established new partnerships, increased production, and turned to the nation's nationalism while it was under sanctions. While the economic sanctions may be appropriate as a foreign policy tool to compel compliance or behavioral change, they may not work alone. Instead, they may reinforce and strengthen what has already been written in political narratives and uphold authoritarian governance.

It also indicates that the international community has significantly affected the context of the sanctions being implemented. Other non-Western countries have been more variably accommodating with Russia, with much more accommodating responses than from the West. The fact, that this divergence reflects an inherently volatile world of non-uni-polarity with shifting power constellations of power.



## **Implications for Foreign Policy**

This study provides essential ramifications for foreign policy, most significantly using economic sanctions as a statecraft instrument. The first step is to accept that sanctions sometimes can backfire and, therefore, be ripe with conviction that the targeted regime will resist sanctions and that the people's attitude toward the West will be hostile. Sanctions cannot be anything less than immediate economic and, at the same time, balanced sanctions, taking into account their political and social ramifications in the distant future.

The study also recommends implementing diplomatic engagement, multilateral cooperation, and economic sanctions of NCDs as part of a foreign policy strategy. Dialogue and negotiation may have to be combined with the sanctions to have the desired effect. In this way, conflict resolution could be developed as a framework that addresses the root causes instead of simply penalizing the states for a certain action.

The findings also show how much value international concord can bring to imposing sanctions. If the response is fragmented, such a reaction erodes its effectiveness and opens room for alliances of other states. Alliance and partner cohesion, however, are preconditions for sanction application to bear fruit.

## **Recommendations for Future Research**

Future research is also likely to examine the impact of sanctions on the formation of political dynamics in the targeted state, particularly authoritarian nations. Analysing how sanctions improve our understanding of public opinion, governance, and civil society can tell us what sanctions do and do not do.

Additionally, such studies could shed light on what factors contribute to a successful or unsuccessful sanction by reviewing several case studies concerning fines in various countries. In addition, they may look at how sanctions interact with other diplomatic tools, such as military alliances or economic incentives for alternative avenues to achieve foreign policy

ends. Second, non-Western countries' responses to sanctions should be investigated: how had they taken action against the rest of the world, that is, against Western as well as sanctioned states? This factor is more and more important in a world ruled by multi-polarity and ongoing geopolitical crises.

Economic sanctions have opportunities and challenges and are also used as a foreign policy tool. Nevertheless, they are not always practical due to the unity of the community of states and the 'resilience' of the targeted regime.

Policies and sanctions, however, occur in a fluid global power dynamic that requires sanctions policy and reaction to be flexible about their potential consequences. If the international community can adopt a more inclusive approach of not simply coercive use of power but rather diplomatic engagement and multilateral cooperation, conflict resolution and global stability will pave the way.

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